Plotinus: How Does the Universe See? Part 2 of 2

But whether perception is of χρεία alone one must investigate in this way.  If there could not be a perception for the soul when it is alone, but perceptions are with the body, [perception] would be because of the body, from which also perceptions come, and perception is given because of the association [of the soul] with the body, and indeed it follows necessarily—for whatever undergoes an affection with respect to the body, also reaches as far as the soul, if it is a stronger affection—or it has been contrived [that we perceive] so as to guard ourselves from that thing causing the affection to destroy [our body] before it becomes greater or closer to us.  But if, indeed, this is so, perceptions would be for χρεία. For if they are also for knowledge, [they would be] for a being not in knowledge but which is ignorant because of circumstance, and in order to remember because of forgetfulness, not for a being not in need nor in forgetfulness.  But if this is the case, there must be an investigation not only about the earth alone, but also about all the stars and especially concerning all the heaven and universe.
(Plotinus, Enneads, IV.4.24 lines 1-14) (1).

In the previous post on this topic, I introduced two ways we are to understand Plotinus’ use of the work chreia— need and use.  In the text we are examining, we are especially applying these two meanings to the case of the universe as a subject of perception, particularly sight. When it comes to determining when and if the universe can see, we can dismiss chreia-need because this would imply a lack on the part of the universe.  That is, the universe would lack knowledge, but Plotinus rules this out by saying, “For if [perceptions] are also for knowledge, [they would be] for a being not in knowledge but which is ignorant because of circumstance, and in order to remember because of forgetfulness, not for a being not in need nor in forgetfulness.”  Yet the universe is not ignorant nor in need of remembering, so this possibility is ruled out: perception cannot be for need.  Furthermore, if the universe is all there is and yet perceives something outside of itself, then the universe would not be all there is.  Thus a second reason for dismissing need as an explanation for the universe’s perception.

Perhaps then, perception is for the use of the universe.  Remember that in the text, Plotinus has said that whenever there is a thing with (at least) two parts, one part, when it is affected, transmits it affections to the other part, if it is a sufficiently strong affection. (2)  In this more opaque language it was first presented as the initial option of the disjunction concerning the chreia of perception.  As it is applied less broadly, the parts being discussed are the body and the soul.  In the case of the universe under investigation, when one part undergoes an affection (sphere of the planets), then this is transmitted to the soul of the universe by necessity (resulting in sight).

Although it is true that the universe does not see for the purpose of gaining new information, it can, as we can look at our own hand, nevertheless look at itself with a part of itself.  On first glance, it would appear that the universe looking at itself would be vain, to no effect (μάτην).  But if looking at itself just happens as a matter of course, then, Plotinus’ line of thought goes, looking at itself is not vain, because this is not the purpose of its looking, but is the necessary consequence of the way the universe is set up.

(1)
Τὸ δὲ εἰ τῆς χρείας μόνον ἡ αἴσθησις, ὧδε σκεπτέον.
Εἰ δὴ ψυχῇ μὲν μόνῃ οὐκ ἂν αἴσθησις γίνοιτο, μετὰ δὲ
σώματος αἱ αἰσθήσεις, διὰ σῶμα ἂν εἴη, ἐξ οὗπερ καὶ αἱ
αἰσθήσεις, καὶ διὰ τὴν σώματος κοινωνίαν δοθεῖσα, καὶ
ἤτοι ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπακολουθοῦσα—ὅ τι γὰρ πάσχει τὸ   (5)
σῶμα, καὶ φθάνει τὸ πάθος μεῖζον ὂν μέχρι ψυχῆς—
ἢ καὶμεμηχάνηται, ὅπως καὶ πρὶν μεῖζον γενέσθαι τὸ ποιοῦν,
ὥστε καὶ φθεῖραι, ἢ καὶ πρὶν πλησίον γενέσθαι, φυλάξασθαι.
Εἰ δὴ τοῦτο, πρὸς χρείαν ἂν εἶεν αἱ αἰσθήσεις. Καὶ γὰρ εἰ
καὶ πρὸς γνῶσιν, τῷ μὴ ἐν γνώσει ὄντι ἀλλ’ ἀμαθαίνοντι    (10)
διὰ συμφοράν, καὶ ἵνα ἀναμνησθῇ διὰ λήθην, οὐ τῷ μήτε
ἐν χρείᾳ μήτε ἐν λήθῃ. Ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο, οὐ περὶ τῆς γῆς ἂν
μόνον εἴη σκοπεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ἄστρων ἁπάντων καὶ
μάλιστα περὶ παντὸς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ κόσμου.

(2)
Plotinus is here likely taking up a line of thought from Plato, “Assume that some of the affections of our body are extinguished in the body before they reach the soul, leaving the soul unaffected, and that other affections permeate both body and soul and cause a vibration in both conjointly and in each individually” (Trans. Fowler, Philebus, 33d).

Old Age and Justice in the Republic

Near the beginning of the Politics Aristotle says that the young should not study politics, for they have not yet acquired the experience requisite for such a science.  Perhaps a similar concern, free of prohibition, offers Plato a reason to introduce the character of Cephalus at the beginning of the Republic.

Cephalus, as it turns out, is a very old man.(1)  Socrates tells us that he is very eager to speak to the aged, because all have to travel down the path of old age, and he wants to know “what kind of road it is, rough and difficult, or easy and passable.”(2)  Plato uses Cephalus, as seems plain from his hasty exit, for a characteristically dramatic and philosophical purpose.  Cephalus himself elaborates on the topic of old age, eagerly opining to a rare audience, Socrates, that although the carousing long nights of youth are no longer possible, gone also is the despotism of sexual desire.  More importantly, he mentions that though wealth is a palliative in old age, character is more important.(3)  More somberly, Cephalus continues on to admit that of late he has been haunted by the fear of his life after death— the hand of death is beginning to point at him.  “The tales told concerning those in Hades, how it is necessary that those who have been unjust must pay the penalty there, although entirely laughable up to this point, at that point [of encroaching mortality] they harrow his soul that they may be true.” (4)

Cephalus emphasizes however, that just deeds, stored and accumulated throughout a life, are a sweet hope to the man in old age that he will escape such horrors.  It is from Cephalus then, by the exortation of old age, the idea that a complete life must be lived justly in order to reap the easy conscience of old age, and that character, informed by the requirements of justice may allow a soul to pass into the blessed afterworld, that the great themes of justice and morality are introduced into the dialogue.  Far from being an abstract treatise, Plato foresees for us a path that all must take, that of a burdensome or light old age, and gives us no determination of the fate of Cephalus, but bids us examine our own.


 

REFERENCES:

Translations mine.

  1. 328b9 μάλα πρεσβύτης
  2. 328e3-4 ποία τίς ἐστιν, τραχεῖα καὶ χαλεπή,
    ἢ ῥᾳδία καὶ εὔπορος.
  3. 329d3 ὁ τρόπος
  4. 330d7-e2 οἵ τε γὰρ λεγόμενοι μῦθοι περὶ
    τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου, ὡς τὸν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσαντα δεῖ ἐκεῖ διδόναι δίκην, καταγελώμενοι τέως, τότε δὴ στρέφουσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν μὴ ἀληθεῖς ὦσιν·

Ethnographic “Racism” in Ancient Philosophy

There can be very little, except the evergreen pride of modernity, that gives us hope that our beliefs and practices are exempt from some future condemnation in a world so distant our comprehension of it could hardly be distinguished from loathing.  When it comes to our own canon of sins, foremost among them appear to be those forms of discrimination that are lodged against certain groups or classes.  As an analog to these prohibitions, social propriety has, probably correctly, identified among the chief causes stereotypes and accordingly speaking of the general characteristics of a people is deemed off-color and brutish.  There are occasional and accepted forays into the generic, though.  Despite the mild import of such thoughts as, “The French have wonderful cuisine,” it is a curious thing to distinguish what exactly it is we object to when we hear a generalism about a culture or race.  Before I ask a few questions about that, it may be helpful to look at a couple things said, by way of example, by Hippocrates and Plato.

And concerning the listlessness and cowardice of peoples, the seasons are especially the cause why Asians are less martial than the Europeans and more tame in their character,for making no dramatic shift either to the hot nor to the cold their seasons are temperate. For there are no mental disturbances nor strong change of the body, from which it is more likely that the passion is roused and indulges the senseless and high-spirited rather than when it is in a steady state.  For it is change of everything which wake the disposition of men and do not allow it to rest.  For these aforesaid reasons it seems to me that that the Asian race is weak and yet further so because of their customs.  For much of Asia is ruled by a king.  And where men do not rule themselves nor are autonomous, but are ruled by a despot, there is no reason for them to concern themselves over this.  So that they do not practice the military disciplines, but they work to seem pacifistic (Hippocrates, Airs, Waters, Places, XVI). (1)

 

For it would be absurd if someone should think that spiritedness does not occur in our cities from private citizens, who indeed have this reputation, such as those who live throughout Thrace and Scythia and nearly all the northern areas, or love of learning, which indeed someone would say is especially prevalent in the area around us, or as someone would say that the love of money is not least among the Phoenicians or Egyptians (Plato, Republic 435e3-436a3). (2)

Setting aside the accuracy of Hippocrates’ description of Asians, his explanation appealing to geographical and sociological causes is less jarring than Plato’s, whose opinion appears informed only by a cryptic Athenian prejudice.  Both cases, however, are less egregious than when a comparison is made between groups wherein one is deemed superior, one inferior, such as in the following from Aristotle.

Therefore the poets say, “It is fitting that the Greeks rule barbarians,” on the grounds that the barbarian and slave are the same in nature (Politics 1252b7-9). (3)

A few questions:

What makes the above offensive to contemporary attitudes?  Is it that a group is generalized?  Or is it that a group is generalized negatively?  (That is, a positive characterization would be acceptable.)  Or is it that a group is generalized negatively and untruly? (But this would imply that a negative generalization, if true, would be acceptable. Or on the other hand perhaps, does this mean true, negative generalizations are ruled out a priori?)

 


 

REFERENCES:

Translations mine

(1)
περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀθυμίης τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῆς ἀνανδρείης, ὅτι ἀπολεμώτεροί εἰσι τῶν Εὐρωπαίων οἱ Ἀσιηνοὶ καὶ ἡμερώτεροι τὰ ἤθεα αἱ ὧραι αἴτιαι μάλιστα, οὐ μεγάλας τὰς μεταβολὰς ποιεύμεναι οὔτε ἐπὶ τὸ θερμὸν οὔτε ἐπὶ τὸ ψυχρόν, ἀλλὰ παραπλησίως. οὐ γὰρ γίνονται ἐκπλήξιες τῆς γνώμης οὔτε μετάστασις ἰσχυρὴ τοῦ σώματος, ἀφ᾿ ὅτων εἰκὸς τὴν ὀργὴν ἀγριοῦσθαί τε καὶ τοῦ ἀγνώμονος καὶ θυμοειδέος μετέχειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ αἰεὶ ἐόντα. αἱ γὰρ μεταβολαί εἰσι τῶν πάντων αἱ ἐπεγείρουσαι τὴν γνώμην τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ οὐκ ἐῶσαι ἀτρεμίζειν. διὰ ταύτας ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ τὰς προφάσιας ἄναλκες εἶναι τὸ γένος τὸ Ἀσιηνὸν καὶ προσέτι διὰ τοὺς νόμους. τῆς γὰρ Ἀσίης τὰ πολλὰ βασιλεύεται. ὅκου δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἑωυτῶν εἰσι καρτεροὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι μηδὲ αὐτόνομοι, ἀλλὰ δεσπόζονται, οὐ περὶ τούτου αὐτοῖσιν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, ὅκως τὰ πολέμια ἀσκήσωσιν, ἀλλ᾿ ὅκως μὴ δόξωσι μάχιμοι εἶναι.

(2)
γελοῖον
γὰρ ἂν εἴη εἴ τις οἰηθείη τὸ θυμοειδὲς μὴ ἐκ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν
ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐγγεγονέναι, οἳ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσι ταύτην τὴν
αἰτίαν, οἷον οἱ κατὰ τὴν Θρᾴκην τε καὶ Σκυθικὴν καὶ σχεδόν
τι κατὰ τὸν ἄνω τόπον, ἢ τὸ φιλομαθές, ὃ δὴ τὸν παρ’ ἡμῖν
μάλιστ’ ἄν τις αἰτιάσαιτο τόπον, ἢ τὸ φιλοχρήματον τὸ περὶ
τούς τε Φοίνικας εἶναι καὶ τοὺς κατὰ Αἴγυπτον φαίη τις ἂν
οὐχ ἥκιστα.

(3)
διό φασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ
βαρβάρων δ᾿ Ἕλληνας ἄρχειν εἰκός,
ὡς ταὐτὸ φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δοῦλον ὄν.