Why does Plato Shackle the Neck in the Allegory of the Cave?

Anyone who is familiar with Plato has no doubt noticed the emphasis that he places on focusing our attention on the world of being and ignoring the world of becoming.  Another way of saying this is that the present material world is less important than the everlasting eternal world of truth and Forms.

In this post, I want to point out similar imagery which is used in three different dialogues, all concerned with the ultimate apprehension of reality.  In these dialogues, Plato uses the imagery of the head, when it is free and unencumbered, as a symbol for the ability to properly see the intelligible realm, the heavenly realm, the realm of reality.

Let us first look at the Phaedrus.  As Socrates has narrated about the life of the gods, he next wishes to tell us about the life of mortals.  He does so, using the framing metaphor of the charioteer and horses as a stand-in for the soul.

And this is the life of the gods.  But of the other souls, one follows god best and is like him and raises the head of the charioteer into the realm outside, being carried together in the revolution, and being thrown into tumult by the horses and seldom see the things that really are.  But the other soul raises it head, then lowers it, and because the horses are being forceful, it sees some things and other things it does not.  All the other souls are striving to follow the region above, but are unable… (Phaedrus 248a1-e1). 1

Thus, the raising of the head is symbolic of the ability to see truths and real being that transcends the mundane and insubstantial.

In the Phaedo we see a similar line of thought.  A description has just been given of the earth, how it is much larger than we imagine it to be.  Here the comparison is to a fish, if it could lift its head above the water and see what is happening upon the earth.

By weakness and stupidity we are not able to pass through to the farthest aether.  Since, if someone were to go to the heights of the earth or having become winged, took flight, he would lift his head and look around, just as here the fish in the sea can lift their heads to see the things on earth, so someone could see the things there [in the realm above] (Phaedo 109e1-5). 2

It is helpful to keep in mind the kind of philosophical power and freedom which is represented by the head.  With the Phaedo and Phaedrus in the background, a certain famous passage in the Republic, the allegory of the cave, becomes enriched.  Here also the dignity of the head, being the repository of sight, the noblest of the senses, is emphasized, but by negation.  It is not the freedom of the head here, but its imprisonment that merits mentioning.

Being in this [cave] since childhood in shackles around their legs and necks, so that they remain in place only to see straight before them, but they are unable to turn their heads about in a circle because of the bond (Republic 514a5-b2). 3

The prisoner in the cave, ignorant of what is happening outside the cave, has his neck restrained in such a way that he cannot even move it.  It seems plausible to believe the main purpose of the shackles around his neck are not meant to keep him in one place, after all the leg shackles, already described, will do that.  Rather, the purpose of a bond around his neck is meant to keep him undiscerning.  After all, this is the answer when it is asked whether such a prisoner could see through the shadows to the real world:

For how could they, if they were forced to have their necks unmoving through life? (Republic 515a9-b1). 4

 


 

1 (a)   Καὶ οὗτος μὲν θεῶν βίος· αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι ψυχαί, ἡ μὲν
ἄριστα θεῷ ἑπομένη καὶ εἰκασμένη ὑπερῆρεν εἰς τὸν ἔξω
τόπον τὴν τοῦ ἡνιόχου κεφαλήν, καὶ συμπεριηνέχθη τὴν
περιφοράν, θορυβουμένη ὑπὸ τῶν ἵππων καὶ μόγις καθορῶσα
τὰ ὄντα· ἡ δὲ τοτὲ μὲν ἦρεν, τοτὲ δ’ ἔδυ, βιαζομένων δὲ τῶν   (5)
ἵππων τὰ μὲν εἶδεν, τὰ δ’ οὔ. αἱ δὲ δὴ ἄλλαι γλιχόμεναι
μὲν ἅπασαι τοῦ ἄνω ἕπονται, ἀδυνατοῦσαι δέ…

2  (e) τόν, ὑπ’ ἀσθενείας καὶ βραδυτῆτος οὐχ οἵους τε εἶναι ἡμᾶς
διεξελθεῖν ἐπ’ ἔσχατον τὸν ἀέρα· ἐπεί, εἴ τις αὐτοῦ ἐπ’ ἄκρα
ἔλθοι ἢ πτηνὸς γενόμενος ἀνάπτοιτο, κατιδεῖν <ἂν> ἀνακύ-
ψαντα, ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε οἱ ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης ἰχθύες ἀνακύ-
πτοντες ὁρῶσι τὰ ἐνθάδε, οὕτως ἄν τινα καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ κατιδεῖν…   (5)

3 ἐν ταύτῃ ἐκ παίδων ὄντας ἐν δεσμοῖς καὶ τὰ   (5)
σκέλη καὶ τοὺς αὐχένας, ὥστε μένειν τε αὐτοὺς εἴς τε τὸ
(b) πρόσθεν μόνον ὁρᾶν, κύκλῳ δὲ τὰς κεφαλὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ
ἀδυνάτους περιάγειν…

4 Πῶς γάρ, ἔφη, εἰ ἀκινήτους γε τὰς κεφαλὰς ἔχειν ἠναγκα-
(b) σμένοι εἶεν διὰ βίου;

Angry Soul, Angry Body in Aristotle

And it seems also that all the affections of the soul accompany the body: anger, gentleness, fear, pity, courage, and even more, joy and both loving and hating.  For the body is somewhat affected with the emotions.  On occasion, although there are strong and clear disturbances, it is evident that there is no irritation or fearing [from the body]; yet sometimes there is physical movement [of the body] at the instigation of small and trivial things, whenever the body is excited and in this same way whenever the body grows angry.  And yet this example is more clear:  [sometimes] although nothing fearful occurs among the emotions, there are fearful things coming into existence in the emotions of one when he is frightened.  And if this is so, it is clear that the emotions are formulae implicated in matter.[1]  (De Anima 403a16-25)

Among the vexations of the De Anima that scholars either discover or invent, rediscover from past commentators, or– at the mercy of their own textual uncharitableness – are blithely inserted, those among the first book are the most frequently ignored.  In part, of course, this is due to the function of the first book as mainly “setting the table,” asking the questions that need to be asked and in the process determining a method to be followed, as well as laying out prior (and faulty) views about the soul.  There is less substantive (or should it be incorporeal?) material for discussing and analyzing.

But there are a number of fascinating discursions in the first book.  One of these is a small discussion about whether the emotions or affections (πάθη pathe) can be separated from the body.  The “proof”, if one can refer to the experience Aristotle provides as evidence for such, is offered by some philosophically ambiguous conditions that point to the association of the bodily with the emotional.  As is not unusual with Aristotle, he does not elaborate his theory to the reader’s satisfaction, yet uncharacteristically he gives no examples for the situations he describes.

I would like to offer a few examples on Aristotle’s behalf.  Perhaps they are poorly exampled, but in an effort to understand what he is saying, unfortunately we must fill in his formula to see if his assessment is right.

If I were to paraphrase him, I would say this:  Sometimes when there are clear and present dangers there is no reaction, no provocation or shrinking on our part.  Think of a tightrope walker who does not flinch as he carefully crosses a rope strung hundreds of feet in the air.  He does not experience the emotion of fear, and thus his body does not produce the symptoms of fear.  If the emotions were not so closely allied with the body however, we might expect the body to start sweating profusely as it sensed (through the eyes) the great height from which it could fall.  But it does not do so.  On the other hand there are times when there are small and silly trifles which really cause a stir in us.  For example, sometimes the sound of a phone going off, a circumstance familiar enough, can cause anger in us if it is in an inappropriate setting, such as at a theatre.  But it is not the sound itself that causes the anger to manifest in the body, rather it is the soul which is angry in some sense, and in turn the soul causes the physical symptoms of anger in the body.  These two examples show that the body follows the lead of the soul in that when the physical manifestations of anger occur, it is because of the soul, not because of a physiological reaction.  But if you are not yet convinced, I have got a better example.  Sometimes the soul can produce the physical symptoms of fear by itself when they are no frightening things in sight.  A man can fear that he might meet a mugger on the street, or fear while dreaming, but despite the object of his fear being absent or non-existent, his soul can nevertheless produce the physical symptoms of fear within his body.  Thus when the emotions fear, the body fears also.  When there is anger qua emotion, there is anger qua body.

There is a great subtlety of reasoning here on Aristotle’s part, but I think his argument is inconclusive.  His effort shows that when the physical products of feeling manifest, there was a logically antecedent feeling in the soul beforehand.  But does this mean that if there is the feeling of anger, for example, there must also be some physical manifestation of that feeling, be it ever so small?  I would gravitate toward yes, but perhaps for a given emotion, there is a counterexample.  Take courage (θάρσος tharsos) which Aristotle gives as an example in this very passage.  If there is not an actual battle or appropriate circumstance for someone to partake in (i.e. evidence his courage through action) could it be said that this person is feeling courageous?  I would say yes, but on Aristotle’s view, this does not seem possible.


[1] ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη πάντα εἶναι μετὰ σώματος, θυμός, πραότης, φόβος, ἔλεος, θάρσος, ἔτι χαρὰ καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τε καὶ μισεῖν· ἅμα γὰρ τούτοις πάσχει τι τὸ σῶμα. μηνύει δὲ τὸ ποτὲ μὲν ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ἐναργῶν παθημάτων συμβαινόντων μηδὲν παροξύνεσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐνίοτε δ’ ὑπὸ μικρῶν καὶ ἀμαυρῶν κινεῖσθαι, ὅταν ὀργᾷ τὸ σῶμα καὶ οὕτως ἔχῃ ὥσπερ ὅταν ὀργίζηται. ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦτο φανερόν· μηθενὸς γὰρ φοβεροῦ συμβαίνοντος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι γίνονται τοῖς τοῦ φοβουμένου. εἰ δ’ οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι τὰ πάθη λόγοι ἔνυλοί εἰσιν.