After these things, [one must observe] that neither matter nor form comes to be, I mean the ultimate ones. For everything undergoes change as something and by something and into something. The by something is the initiating mover, the something is the matter, and the into which is the form. Therefore they continue into an infinite regress, if not only bronze comes to be round but also the round comes to be and the bronze comes to be. Indeed, there must be a stopping point (My translation, Metaphysics 1069b35-1070a4) (1).
This is how Lamda 3 begins. Focus for a moment on the infinite regress which Aristotle offers as a consequence of this first paragraph. What line of reasoning is Aristotle following here? Certainly if bronze has to come to be before it even serves as the subject of a transition into a bronze statue, then the process is pushed back one step. But why should this be an infinite regress. In other contexts, Aristotle uses eis apeiron to mean infinite regress, so I think it is solid to interpret it as such here.
I believe that Aristotle is here already assuming a substratum or hypokeimenon. The idea of a substratum, or underlying thing, would seem to serve at least two purposes. The first would be to explain the persistence of a thing through change and over time. Secondly to avoid having to explain the antecedent coming to be of something in order to serve as the subject of a change. It is perhaps this second idea that is motivating Aristotle’s infinite regress. I will try to develop this idea in a second post.
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Notes:
(1) Μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι οὐ γίγνεται οὔτε ἡ ὕλη οὔτε τὸ εἶδος, (35)
λέγω δὲ τὰ ἔσχατα. πᾶν γὰρ μεταβάλλει τὶ καὶ ὑπό
(1070a) τινος καὶ εἴς τι· ὑφ’ οὗ μέν, τοῦ πρώτου κινοῦντος· ὃ δέ, ἡ
ὕλη· εἰς ὃ δέ, τὸ εἶδος. εἰς ἄπειρον οὖν εἶσιν, εἰ μὴ μόνον
ὁ χαλκὸς γίγνεται στρογγύλος ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ στρογγύλον
ἢ ὁ χαλκός· ἀνάγκη δὴ στῆναι.
I’ll give my gloss on the passage.
[A] Μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι οὐ γίγνεται οὔτε ἡ ὕλη οὔτε τὸ εἶδος, λέγω δὲ τὰ ἔσχατα.
Next, [there is the fact] that there is no coming-into-being of either matter or form, and [by this] I mean the final [matter and form of the thing].
# Aristotle states the conclusion to the proven: in a change, neither the matter of the thing that results nor its form comes to be, simply speaking. The matter of the thing that is changing does come to be something – it comes to bear the form; and in this way, the form comes to be, too, but only as what the changing thing becomes.
[B] πᾶν γὰρ μεταβάλλει τὶ καὶ ὑπό τινος καὶ εἴς τι· ὑφ’ οὗ μέν, τοῦ πρώτου κινοῦντος· ὃ δέ, ἡ ὕλη· εἰς ὃ δέ, τὸ εἶδος.
For every [changing] thing changes as something [a subject] and by something and toward something. That by which [it changes] is the primary agent, what [changes] is the matter, and that to which [it changes] is the form.
# Moreover, Aristotle reminds us, the termini of the change can only be understood by reference to an agent endowing the matter (the subject) with a form. In other words, only by appeal to an agent (bearing a form) affecting a subject or patient (lacking that form) such that it comes to have that form can we can so much as identify a change as the very change it is.
[C] εἰς ἄπειρον οὖν εἶσιν, εἰ μὴ μόνον ὁ χαλκὸς γίγνεται στρογγύλος ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ στρογγύλον ἢ ὁ χαλκός· ἀνάγκη δὴ στῆναι.
Things will go to infinity, then, if not only the bronze comes to be [something, i.e.] spherical, but also sphericity or the bronze [comes to be]. So these must stand [viz. be unchanging].
# Aristotle implicitly argues by reductio.
Take the change described by ‘the bronze comes to be spherical’. By [B] we must understand this in terms of an agent endowing the bronze with sphericity; for that is what makes this change a change into sphericity from bronze and not some other change (of clay into a human figure, say).
But suppose in that very change into formed bronze, that the form of the bronze (sphericity) also comes to be. Then we have no explanation of the form _in the agent_, by which we understand this change as a change into sphericity and not, say, a cube or a human figure. Hence, we will first have to explain this change, which by another application of [B] requires another agent, distinct from the agent of the initial change to be understood.
Likewise, suppose in the very change into formed bronze, that the bronze (the matter) also comes to be. Then we have no explanation of what comes to bear the form, i.e., the patient on which the agent acts, by which we understand this change as a change from bronze and not say, clay or marble. Hence, we will first have to explain this change, which by another application of [B] requires another patient, distinct from the patient on which the agent of the first change acts.
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These are, of course, the same reductio expressed in different ways, since agency implies corresponding patiency and vice versa. I do not think the regress is temporal (there must be a temporally prior change to explain how we got some matter and some form), but rather logical (there must be something to explain the form/matter of the first change, which requires positing a different agency/patiency relationship and so on). Aristotle, I take it, thinks there’s nothing puzzling about there being temporally prior changes, as when he comments on the transmission of form over generations of living things.
This argument is connected closely – though not in a way I can put concisely – to the idea that the matter and form of a thing cannot be related as subject and predicate, since being a subject is already being something determinate.
Thank you. Very clear explication, as always,
“Likewise, suppose in the very change into formed bronze, that the bronze (the matter) also comes to be. Then we have no explanation of what comes to bear the form, i.e., the patient on which the agent acts, by which we understand this change as a change from bronze and not say, clay or marble. Hence, we will first have to explain this change, which by another application of [B] requires another patient, distinct from the patient on which the agent of the first change acts.”
At this point though, haven’t we got to rock bottom? This is a regress, sure, but a two step regress is hardly infinite. Is there a way to develop this example further? (You don’t have to take it to infinity!)
I am curious as to whether there is a dual concern to avoid an infinite regress on one hand, while not giving intellectual aid and comfort to the Atomists’ doctrine, of atomic structure, on the other.
I also wonder if λέγω δὲ τὰ ἔσχατα is just a definition, which is to be understood in tandem with ἀνάγκη δὴ στῆναι.