Ethnographic “Racism” in Ancient Philosophy

There can be very little, except the evergreen pride of modernity, that gives us hope that our beliefs and practices are exempt from some future condemnation in a world so distant our comprehension of it could hardly be distinguished from loathing.  When it comes to our own canon of sins, foremost among them appear to be those forms of discrimination that are lodged against certain groups or classes.  As an analog to these prohibitions, social propriety has, probably correctly, identified among the chief causes stereotypes and accordingly speaking of the general characteristics of a people is deemed off-color and brutish.  There are occasional and accepted forays into the generic, though.  Despite the mild import of such thoughts as, “The French have wonderful cuisine,” it is a curious thing to distinguish what exactly it is we object to when we hear a generalism about a culture or race.  Before I ask a few questions about that, it may be helpful to look at a couple things said, by way of example, by Hippocrates and Plato.

And concerning the listlessness and cowardice of peoples, the seasons are especially the cause why Asians are less martial than the Europeans and more tame in their character,for making no dramatic shift either to the hot nor to the cold their seasons are temperate. For there are no mental disturbances nor strong change of the body, from which it is more likely that the passion is roused and indulges the senseless and high-spirited rather than when it is in a steady state.  For it is change of everything which wake the disposition of men and do not allow it to rest.  For these aforesaid reasons it seems to me that that the Asian race is weak and yet further so because of their customs.  For much of Asia is ruled by a king.  And where men do not rule themselves nor are autonomous, but are ruled by a despot, there is no reason for them to concern themselves over this.  So that they do not practice the military disciplines, but they work to seem pacifistic (Hippocrates, Airs, Waters, Places, XVI). (1)

 

For it would be absurd if someone should think that spiritedness does not occur in our cities from private citizens, who indeed have this reputation, such as those who live throughout Thrace and Scythia and nearly all the northern areas, or love of learning, which indeed someone would say is especially prevalent in the area around us, or as someone would say that the love of money is not least among the Phoenicians or Egyptians (Plato, Republic 435e3-436a3). (2)

Setting aside the accuracy of Hippocrates’ description of Asians, his explanation appealing to geographical and sociological causes is less jarring than Plato’s, whose opinion appears informed only by a cryptic Athenian prejudice.  Both cases, however, are less egregious than when a comparison is made between groups wherein one is deemed superior, one inferior, such as in the following from Aristotle.

Therefore the poets say, “It is fitting that the Greeks rule barbarians,” on the grounds that the barbarian and slave are the same in nature (Politics 1252b7-9). (3)

A few questions:

What makes the above offensive to contemporary attitudes?  Is it that a group is generalized?  Or is it that a group is generalized negatively?  (That is, a positive characterization would be acceptable.)  Or is it that a group is generalized negatively and untruly? (But this would imply that a negative generalization, if true, would be acceptable. Or on the other hand perhaps, does this mean true, negative generalizations are ruled out a priori?)

 


 

REFERENCES:

Translations mine

(1)
περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀθυμίης τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῆς ἀνανδρείης, ὅτι ἀπολεμώτεροί εἰσι τῶν Εὐρωπαίων οἱ Ἀσιηνοὶ καὶ ἡμερώτεροι τὰ ἤθεα αἱ ὧραι αἴτιαι μάλιστα, οὐ μεγάλας τὰς μεταβολὰς ποιεύμεναι οὔτε ἐπὶ τὸ θερμὸν οὔτε ἐπὶ τὸ ψυχρόν, ἀλλὰ παραπλησίως. οὐ γὰρ γίνονται ἐκπλήξιες τῆς γνώμης οὔτε μετάστασις ἰσχυρὴ τοῦ σώματος, ἀφ᾿ ὅτων εἰκὸς τὴν ὀργὴν ἀγριοῦσθαί τε καὶ τοῦ ἀγνώμονος καὶ θυμοειδέος μετέχειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ αἰεὶ ἐόντα. αἱ γὰρ μεταβολαί εἰσι τῶν πάντων αἱ ἐπεγείρουσαι τὴν γνώμην τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ οὐκ ἐῶσαι ἀτρεμίζειν. διὰ ταύτας ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ τὰς προφάσιας ἄναλκες εἶναι τὸ γένος τὸ Ἀσιηνὸν καὶ προσέτι διὰ τοὺς νόμους. τῆς γὰρ Ἀσίης τὰ πολλὰ βασιλεύεται. ὅκου δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἑωυτῶν εἰσι καρτεροὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι μηδὲ αὐτόνομοι, ἀλλὰ δεσπόζονται, οὐ περὶ τούτου αὐτοῖσιν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, ὅκως τὰ πολέμια ἀσκήσωσιν, ἀλλ᾿ ὅκως μὴ δόξωσι μάχιμοι εἶναι.

(2)
γελοῖον
γὰρ ἂν εἴη εἴ τις οἰηθείη τὸ θυμοειδὲς μὴ ἐκ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν
ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐγγεγονέναι, οἳ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσι ταύτην τὴν
αἰτίαν, οἷον οἱ κατὰ τὴν Θρᾴκην τε καὶ Σκυθικὴν καὶ σχεδόν
τι κατὰ τὸν ἄνω τόπον, ἢ τὸ φιλομαθές, ὃ δὴ τὸν παρ’ ἡμῖν
μάλιστ’ ἄν τις αἰτιάσαιτο τόπον, ἢ τὸ φιλοχρήματον τὸ περὶ
τούς τε Φοίνικας εἶναι καὶ τοὺς κατὰ Αἴγυπτον φαίη τις ἂν
οὐχ ἥκιστα.

(3)
διό φασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ
βαρβάρων δ᾿ Ἕλληνας ἄρχειν εἰκός,
ὡς ταὐτὸ φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δοῦλον ὄν.

One thought on “Ethnographic “Racism” in Ancient Philosophy

  1. I believe it is imperative that we distinguish between racism per se or personal or social racism and institutional racism. For one to think and say that his’/her race/people are the best, are superior to all others (e.g. the child’s “my mother is the best mother in the whole wide world”) may offend others or may hurt the feelings of others, but in reality does no injustice to anyone. In contrast, if an institution such as a government or a bank or an employer denies a service or a benefit to someone as a matter of policy simply because of his/her race, that is an injustice.

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