Monthly Archives: July 2013

Four Predicables: Accident

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    An accident is that which is none of these, not a definition, property or genus, but it belongs to the thing, and which is admitted to belong to one and the same thing, and also not belong, such as “sitting” is admitted as belonging to one and the same thing and also not belonging. Likewise “whiteness” is also an example. There is nothing to hinder the same thing being at one time white and another time not-white. The second of the definitions of accident is better. For with the first definition being said, it is necessary, if someone is going to understand, to know beforehand what a definition and genus and property are, but the second is self-sufficient for knowing what the thing said is by itself. The things compared with one another are also placed as among the category of “accident,” if they are spoken of in any way owing to the accident, such as whether the noble or fitting is more choice-worthy, and whether the life of virtue or pleasure is more pleasing, and if anything else happens to be said resembling these questions. In all these cases an investigation begins as to which of the two does the predicate preferably belong to. And it is evident from these that nothing hinders the accident from becoming a property in relation to something else, such as “sitting” is an accident, whenever someone sits, but it will be at another time a property, namely the property of not being the only one sitting in relation to others not sitting. The result is that nothing hinders an accident from becoming a property in relation to a certain thing or time. But it will never be a pure property.1

Topica 102b4-b26

In this section Aristotle offers two definitions for accident. The first is that an accident is not a definition, property or genus. This is problematic, as he admits, for one must first know what these later three are before one can create a conceptual category that accommodates their negation. His clearer definition is that an accident is something, as an attribute or property, which can apply or not apply to something at different times. This definition tracks well with our English understanding of accident, for instance when we say that something is ‘accidental,’ we mean that things could have turned out differently than they did. There is no necessary correspondence between what could have happened and what did happen.

Also related to accidents are questions regarding the assignment of an accident, such as, “Does x or y have more of z?” In Aristotle’s examples, he asks which of two things are “more choice-worthy” or “more pleasant.” Of the “choice-worthy,” he asks to which of two types of life, the life of virtue or the life of leisure, is the term properly predicated. Given our external knowledge of Aristotle, such as that the life of virtue is indisputably more choice-worthy than the life of leisure (viz. Nicomachean Ethics) we can assume that Aristotle is making a grammatical point here, more so than a philosophical one. This is further corroborated by the fact that he follows this up by saying, “In all these cases an investigation begins as to which of the two does the predicate (τὸ κατηγορούμενον) preferably belong to.” I take Aristotle then, to mean that the assignment of an accident– as the predicate of a sentence– also occurs when there is a comparison of terms where one thing has more or less of the accident than another thing. For example, “Is the shoe or pencil heavier?,” has the answer, “The shoe.” Thus we say, “The shoe is heavier.” In so far as this can be said, it is said of the shoe accidentally, as this could change to, “The shoe is is not heavier,” if we were to ask, “Is the shoe or chair heavier?”

Returning to his previous definition of property, Aristotle notes that some accidents can be a property. But reiterating his previous distinction between real properties and quasi or contingent properties (see 102a18), he informs us that an accident can only be of the former type.

1 Συμβεβηκὸς δέ ἐστιν ὃ μηδὲν μὲν τούτων ἐστί, μήτε
ὅρος μήτε ἴδιον μήτε γένος, ὑπάρχει δὲ τῷ πράγματι, (5)
καὶ ὃ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν ὁτῳοῦν ἑνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ
ὑπάρχειν· οἷον τὸ καθῆσθαι ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν τινὶ τῷ
αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ λευκόν· τὸ γὰρ
αὐτὸ οὐθὲν κωλύει ὁτὲ μὲν λευκὸν ὁτὲ δὲ μὴ λευκὸν εἶναι.
ἔστι δὲ τῶν τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ὁρισμῶν ὁ δεύτερος βελτίων· (10)
τοῦ μὲν γὰρ πρώτου ῥηθέντος ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ μέλλει τις συν-
ήσειν, προειδέναι τί ἐστιν ὅρος καὶ ἴδιον καὶ γένος· ὁ δὲ
δεύτερος αὐτοτελής ἐστι πρὸς τὸ γνωρίζειν τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ τὸ
λεγόμενον καθ’ αὑτό. προσκείθωσαν δὲ τῷ συμβεβηκότι
καὶ αἱ πρὸς ἄλληλα συγκρίσεις ὁπωσοῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ συμ- (15)
βεβηκότος λεγόμεναι, οἷον πότερον τὸ καλὸν ἢ τὸ συμφέρον
αἱρετώτερον, καὶ πότερον ὁ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἢ ὁ κατ’ ἀπόλαυ-
σιν ἡδίων βίος, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο παραπλησίως τυγχάνει τού-
τοις λεγόμενον· ἐπὶ πάντων γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων ποτέρῳ μᾶλ-
λον τὸ κατηγορούμενον συμβέβηκεν ἡ ζήτησις γίνεται. δῆ- (20)
λον δ’ ἐξ αὐτῶν ὅτι τὸ συμβεβηκὸς οὐθὲν κωλύει ποτὲ καὶ
πρός τι ἴδιον γίνεσθαι· οἷον τὸ καθῆσθαι, συμβεβηκὸς ὄν,
ὅταν τις μόνος καθῆται, τότε ἴδιον ἔσται, μὴ μόνου δὲ καθ-
ημένου πρὸς τοὺς μὴ καθημένους ἴδιον. ὥστε καὶ πρός τι καὶ
ποτὲ οὐθὲν κωλύει τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἴδιον γίνεσθαι. ἁπλῶς δ’ (25)
ἴδιον οὐκ ἔσται.

The Four Predicables: Genus

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A genus is that which is predicated of many things that also differ in their form with respect to their essence. As many things as he who defines appropriately, “What is the thing?,” sitting before him after he has been asked, such things are said to be predicated in their essence. Just as, in the case of “human,” someone appropriately responds that what lies before him is an animal. Connected with the genus as well is whether a thing is in a genus that is the same as another thing or different from another thing. For such a thing falls under a method the same as genus. For having said that “animal” is the genus of human, and likewise the genus of cow, we shall have said that they are in the same genus. But if we shall prove that it is the genus of one, but it is not the genus of the other, we shall have proved that these are not in the same genus. Topica 102a32-102b3

A genus differs in its form, in that essentially, a horse is different from a dog, yet both are nevertheless part of the same genus. Genus is a level of categorization or class somewhat above the direct level of what we might term species, or in the language of Aristotle, things which differ essentially in their form. A cow or ox (βους) is the same genus as a mouse, though both are essentially different. Interestingly, Aristotle seems to describe a method which ascribes a particular genus to a thing quite independent of whether or not another thing shares the same genus. He says both that, “connected with the genus,” is the question of whether a thing is in the same genus as another thing, and also that, “having said that ‘animal’ is the genus of human, and likewise the genus of cow, we shall have said that they are in the same genus.” The impression given is that these twin assessments of two distinct things are conducted separately, and upon reflection, when it turns out man and cow are both “animal,” then we sweep them into the “same genus.” In my view though, it would appear that a comparison is made from the outset, that one is consciously aware of comparing one thing to another, rather than as an independent assessment. Perhaps this is what Aristotle means. For instance he may be pointing out what is rather obvious, but he states the obvious nonetheless, with the goal of prompting us to have an eye on whether something is of the same genus as another thing. The last sentence in this section seems to support this view, as there is language of proof. Thus, whether or not something is of one genus or another, is helpful in proposing or refuting an argument, one of the chief reason the Topica was written. 2

1 Γένος δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ
εἴδει ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον. ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι δὲ κατηγο-
ρεῖσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα λεγέσθω ὅσα ἁρμόττει ἀποδοῦναι ἐρω-
τηθέντα τί ἐστι τὸ προκείμενον· καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
ἁρμόττει, ἐρωτηθέντα τί ἐστιν, εἰπεῖν ὅτι ζῷον. γενικὸν δὲ (35)
καὶ τὸ πότερον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἄλλο ἄλλῳ ἢ ἐν ἑτέρῳ·
καὶ γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον πίπτει τῷ γένει.
διαλεχθέντες γὰρ ὅτι τὸ ζῷον γένος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ τοῦ βοός, διειλεγμένοι ἐσόμεθα ὅτι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ
(102b.) γένει· ἐὰν δὲ τοῦ μὲν ἑτέρου δείξωμεν ὅτι γένος ἐστί, τοῦ
δὲ ἑτέρου ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι, διειλεγμένοι ἐσόμεθα ὅτι οὐκ ἐν τῷ
αὐτῷ γένει ταῦτ’ ἐστίν.

2 See 101a25: The three uses of the treatise are for mental training, conversations and philosophical knowledge/science.

The Four Predicables: Property

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And a property is that which does not make evident the essence of a thing, but it belongs to the thing alone and can be predicated reciprocally of the thing, for example a property of a human is a natural capacity toward grammar. For if he is a human, he has the capacity of grammar, and conversely, if he has the capacity of grammar, he is a human. For no one says that a property is that which is able to belong to another thing, such as sleeping belongs to the human. Not even if the thing happened to belong to it alone for a certain time. And if one of these things would be called a property, it will not be called a property purely, but a temporary property or a property in relation to something else. For, “Being on the right,” is a temporary property, and “Being two-footed,” happens to be a property in relation to something else, such as man is two-footed with respect to a horse or a dog. And it is obvious that of the things able to belong to another thing, none of them are able to be predicated reciprocally. For it is not necessary, if something sleeps, that it is a human. 1
 Topica 102a18-30

After the introduction of “definition,” which is the essence of something, Aristotle transitions to the idea of what a “property” is. Possibly one of the motivations leading Aristotle to discuss property secondly is that there is a common misconception that the property of something simply is its essence. But Aristotle has told us that the essence of something is its definition, not a property. Man, he informs us, has as one of his properties, the ability to understand grammar. But this is only a property insofar as it can be uniquely said of an individual human being as well, and in addition can be mutually said in reverse: i.e. A man is grammar-capable, the one who is grammar-capable is a man.

As one “proof” of his conception, Aristotle, as he often does, seems to appeal to the common opinion and sense of his listeners: “No one says ‘sleeping’ is a property of the human.” In the background of this comment lies the latent idea that people implicitly only attribute properties if they appear to belong uniquely to some one thing. Not only must a property belong to that thing alone, but it must always belong to it. If not, in Aristotle’s eyes, it is merely a temporary or quasi-property. He gives as examples the relative property “being on the right,” relative because it depends on a temporary relation of space and can change. Similarly, “bipedal,” as a biological categorization, is a term created to distinguish it from other animals which have 4 feet.

Near the end of his discussion Aristotle returns to the idea that properties must apply reciprocally to the things they are properties of, and shows the absurdity of disagreeing. “If something sleeps, it is a man,” is absurd. Although one could understandably (and mistakenly) think that sleep is a property of man, the possibility can be tested by “flipping” the subject and predicate and deciding if what ensues is nonsense.

1
Ἴδιον δ’ ἐστὶν ὃ μὴ δηλοῖ μὲν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, μόνῳ δ’
ὑπάρχει καὶ ἀντικατηγορεῖται τοῦ πράγματος. οἷον ἴδιον
ἀνθρώπου τὸ γραμματικῆς εἶναι δεκτικόν· εἰ γὰρ ἄνθρωπός (20)
ἐστι, γραμματικῆς δεκτικός ἐστι, καὶ εἰ γραμματικῆς δε-
κτικός ἐστιν, ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν. οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἴδιον λέγει τὸ ἐν-
δεχόμενον ἄλλῳ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον τὸ καθεύδειν ἀνθρώπῳ, οὐδ’
ἂν τύχῃ κατά τινα χρόνον μόνῳ ὑπάρχον. εἰ δ’ ἄρα τι
καὶ λέγοιτο τῶν τοιούτων ἴδιον, οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ ποτὲ ἢ (25)
πρός τι ἴδιον ῥηθήσεται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ δεξιῶν εἶναι ποτὲ
ἴδιόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ δίπουν πρός τι ἴδιον τυγχάνει λεγόμενον,
οἷον τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς ἵππον καὶ κύνα. ὅτι δὲ τῶν ἐνδεχο-
μένων ἄλλῳ ὑπάρχειν οὐθὲν ἀντικατηγορεῖται, δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ
ἀναγκαῖον, εἴ τι καθεύδει, ἄνθρωπον εἶναι. (30)