I command you to ponder these things- Parmenides

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“It is necessary that saying and thinking actually are. For being exists, and
nothing does not exist. I command you to ponder these things. For I shut you out from this first inquiry; moreover since it is from this, on which mortals who know nothing wander, being two headed. For helplessness keeps straight the wandering mind in their breasts: and the dumb and likewise the blind are carried around, astounded and confused people, for whom being and non-being are considered the same thing and not the same thing, and their (i.e. of the dumb and blind) path turns back” (DK Frag. 6 :1-9).”

Χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ΄ ἐὸν ἔμμεναι· ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι,
μηδὲν δ΄ οὐκ ἔστιν· τά σ΄ ἐγὼ φράζεσθαι ἄνωγα.
Πρώτης γάρ σ΄  φ΄ ὁδοῦ ταύτης διζήσιος <εἴργω>,
αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ΄  πὸ τῆς, ἣν δὴ βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδέν
πλάττονται, δίκρανοι·  μηχανίη γὰρ ἐν αὐτῶν
στήθεσιν ἰθύνει πλακτὸν νόον· οἱ δὲ φοροῦνται.
κωφοὶ ὁμῶς τυφλοί τε, τεθηπότες, ἄκριτα φῦλα,
οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταὐτὸν νενόμισται
κοὐ ταὐτόν, πάντων δὲ παλίντροπός ἐστι κέλευθος.

With the consideration that Parmenides wrote in hexameters, and that such works were often recited in public, and that Parmenides himself is portrayed by Plato as being present at such a recital of one of his own students [1], I approach this particular fragment differently than if it were merely a philosophical treatise, void of cultural context.
Saying, by existing, is a thing.  The “being-ness” of words is casually assumed by their very use, yet their use qua existence is unreflectively maintained, absent the awareness which appreciates even the possibility of the existence of words.  This “being-ness” of words is re-iterated for the uncognizant by the very fact that Parmenides is speaking words at them, at the audience.  We are incapable of thinking of non-existence.  For any thinking involves the thinking of a thought as thing, a thing which must exist to be a thing.  If it is thought, it is not a nothing, but a something, even if that something is merely a thought (i.e. a unicorn).  We can not think of non-being, for if we could, it would be a being we were thinking of, not non-being.

Therefore all is being.

 

[1] ἀναγιγνώσκειν οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸν Ζήνωνα αὐτόν (Parmenides 127c)
“Zeno himself was reading to them…”  A few lines later Parmenides comes in to hear the end of the reading.

Friends as proper mutuals

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“So if you [Lysis and Menexenus] are friends to each other, by some nature you belong (oikeioi) to each other… And if one desires (epithumei) or loves (epa) another… he would not desire (epithumei) or love (era) or befriend (ephilei), unless he happened to belong (oikeios) to his beloved (eromeno) in some way according to his soul or according to some habit or character or kind (eidos) of soul.

ὑμεῖς ἄρα εἰ φίλοι ἐστὸν ἀλλήλοις, φύσει πῃ οἰκεῖοί ἐσθ᾽ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς.

καὶ εἰ ἄρα τις ἕτερος ἑτέρου ἐπιθυμεῖ… ἢ ἐρᾷ, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐπεθύμει οὐδὲ ἤρα οὐδὲ ἐφίλει, εἰ μὴ οἰκεῖός πῃ τῷ ἐρωμένῳ ἐτύγχανεν ὢν ἢ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ κατά τι τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος ἢ τρόπους ἢ εἶδος.

Lysis 222a1-5

The Lysis, of course, is a dialogue about friendship and friends.  By the time the dialogue has moved toward the end, Socrates offers a startling alternative of “what belongs” as a candidate for what is the friend.  What is striking here is not necessarily the concept of “belongingness” but rather the directionality involving who belongs to whom.  It is not that a lover loves someone, and that this relationship involves the lover loving because the particular beloved “belongs” to him.  Rather it is the reverse.  The lover loves the beloved, because he, the lover, belongs to the beloved.  Under examination then, it appears there is a latent reciprocity in this understanding of friendship as well.  Since they are both friends to each other and belong to each other, they both desire and are desired by the other.  However the erotic force compelling them is not the desire of the owner for his possession, but rather of the possession for its owner.   A paradox seems to arise in this understanding of friendship in that the relationship is simultaneously symmetric in that each party is both lover and loved, and, since a possessor is logically anterior to a possession, asymmetric.

Ancient Philosophy News & Views

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  • The German office of L’Année philologique is in danger of being defunded.  If you are unfamiliar with the service, it is a annual index of all the written scholarship on Greek and Latin sources, including Philosophy.
  • Harvard literary critic Stephen Greenblatt was awarded the 2012 Pulitzer Prize for general nonfiction for his book, “The Swerve: How The World Became Modern.”

    The book examines the discovery and significance of a once-lost epic poem written by the Roman philosopher Lucretius in 50 B.C.

 

 

 

Can friends be similar, identical, or the same?

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Socrates: Is one like person a friend to another like person inasmuch as the first is like the second?  And is such a person useful to the other man?  Actually, consider it this way: What help is able to be bestowed or what harm is able to be inflicted upon one like thing by another like thing? Or what could it undergo, which could not be undergone by itself?  Indeed, how could such things be mutually esteemed by each other, since they provide no aid to each other?  How is it so?

Lysis: It is not so.

ὁ ὅμοιος τῷ ὁμοίῳ καθ᾽ ὅσον ὅμοιος φίλος, καὶ ἔστιν χρήσιμος ὁ τοιοῦτος τῷ τοιούτῳ; μᾶλλον δὲ ὧδε: ὁτιοῦν ὅμοιον ὁτῳοῦν ὁμοίῳ τίνα ὠφελίαν ἔχειν ἢ τίνα βλάβην ἂν ποιῆσαι δύναιτο, ὃ μὴ καὶ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ; ἢ τί ἂν παθεῖν, ὃ μὴ καὶ ὑφ᾽αὑτοῦ πάθοι; τὰ δὴ τοιαῦτα πῶς ἂν ὑπ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἀγαπηθείη, μηδεμίαν ἐπικουρίαν ἀλλήλοις ἔχοντα; ἔστιν ὅπως;

οὐκ ἔστιν.

Lysis 214E-215A

Amongst the many definitions of friendship that have and will be dispensed with in this dialogue, Socrates here argues friendship cannot be based upon likeness.  The reasoning amounts to a practical objection:  If someone already possesses a trait or ability, any desire to duplicate this trait or ability is superfluous.

Socrates’ reasoning here seems to originate from certain analogies of ownership.  If I possess a cup of sugar, I have no need to be a friend to my neighbor to gain a cup of sugar.  Only in those cases where I lack a certain thing do I at all consider the possibility of becoming a friend to someone to gain that certain thing.  (I am unsure if Socrates would include here cases where the “thing” one is seeking is the person/friend himself, and not some intangible/tangible benefit given by the friend/person).

Nevertheless, although it may be true that the like person is not a friend with the like, this cannot be the case based on Socrates’ rationale.

Consider:

1.  To be similar is not to be identical:  In all the relevant ways, one cup of sugar is just as good as any other, as far as cooking goes.  In this functional sense, the cups are identical.  This is not the case with, for example, two people who are similarly skilled mechanics.  They each may know separately certain skills or tricks, which the other person does not.  At one and the same time, they both similarly know the mechanic’s art and they are able to help each other with certain tasks where their individual knowledge falters.  Thus they are friends based on similarity, but not identicality.

2.  Even if two people are identical with respect to a certain personality trait, or a particularly dominating characteristic, such as wisdom, there are still myriad imaginable ways in which they are different.  Two men might be professors of biology, and this will be the predominant characteristic in their lives.  But one might enjoy fencing; while the other uses his spare time to study yoga.  The later could benefit the former by offering exercises to heal an ailing back.  Again, mostly the same is not entirely the same.

3.  Also most of the “helps” and “harms” that a friend could provide are not of the either/or quality.  Being wise, helpful, caring, courageous, and a litany of other traits, are qualities that can diminish or increase, especially so in the context of a nurturing relationship.  So as a courageous person I could increase my courage by hanging around a similarly courageous person, and thereby both of us would benefit.  In this circumstance courage is not something we both “possess” as a product, but rather something we cultivate.

4.  Lastly, it could be argued that a “like” friend serves as a mirror.  He reflects all the good traits one has in oneself, but in the reflection of another one is able to see them more clearly, with greater delight, and from a more objective aspect.

Epictetus on the Perishing of Pots and People (Part 2)

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Concerning each of those things that are alluring or have any usefulness or you are fond of, remember to say, what type it is, even beginning from the smallest things: If you are fond of a pot, that, “I am fond of a pot.”  For if it breaks you will not suffer.  If you kiss your very own little child or wife, that you are kissing a human: because if they die, you will not suffer. Epictetus, Enchiridion I.3

ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστου τῶν ψυχαγωγούντων ἢ χρείαν παρεχόντων ἢ στεργομένων μέμνησο ἐπιλέγειν, ὁποῖόν ἐστιν, ἀπὸ τῶν σμικροτάτων ἀρξάμενος: ἂν χύτραν στέργῃς, ὅτι ‘χύτραν στέργω.’ κατεαγείσης γὰρ αὐτῆς οὐ ταραχθήσῃ: ἂν παιδίον σαυτοῦ καταφιλῇς ἢ γυναῖκα, ὅτι ἄνθρωπον καταφιλεῖς: ἀποθανόντος γὰρ οὐ ταραχθήσῃ.

On my last post on Epictetus, I discussed the therapeutic protocol one is to undertake when encountering an “object” in the world.  It is unclear thus far if Epictetus intends for this mental procedure to be a comprehensive categorization of everything in the world which one could desire.  But it does, consistent with the all-inclusive calculus of a Stoic, include the seemingly least important (pots) all the way up to the most important “objects” (wives and children).

An interpreter could choose to focus on the subjective element of the choice in Epictetus: It is I, this self, that is choosing to love this pot.  And we could, in accord with this view, draw conclusions about foisting our choices promiscuously upon a new object of choice, after the old one has been taken from us. I do not believe this is Epictetus’ view.

Against our expectations of a philosopher who said, in the slanderous paraphrase of the Bard, “there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so”* Epictetus makes it quite clear that we are to focus on “what” our object is (ὁποῖόν ἐστιν).  So when it comes to forefending the grief associated with the loss of a wife, we are to remember that she IS a human, but we merely THINK she is our wife.  We must disabuse ourselves of erroneous dispositions about the actual world, not, as goes the Stoic caricature, mentally grunt it away.

 

*Hamlet Act 2 Scene II lines 250-251

Parmenides, expressibility and pure being

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In my previous post I translated Parmenides fragment 8. Among the most perplexing frustrations, and trust me, there are many in an ancient epic hexameter poem, was the phrase I translated as, “Thought and that thing on account of which thought exists are both the same thing. For not without being, within which thought has been expressed, will you discover thinking.

I had previously struggled to understand what the sentiment was which Parmenides was conveying.  On reflection, and perhaps with an appreciation for the midnight startle I woke up with pondering this sentence over and over again, and moreover, with the over-familiarity I have gained in having translated this sentence “into being”, I now think it rather a straightforward, but not obvious argument.

If there were no existence, nothing existing at all, we would not be able to express anything, for that very expression of something would itself be existing, (because it is something) and then something would, in fact, exist.  The fact that something is verbally expressed demonstrates that something exists, namely at least the expressed and the expresser.  In this sense they are the same thing.

Does Descartes simply steal a version of this argument away from Parmenides, or adapt it?  “I think, therefore I am”, is closely akin to “I speak, therefore I am”, or perhaps more basically, “It is expressed, therefore it exists.”

Any Cartesians out there have a thought (and who also exist)?

 

Parmenides Fragment 8 Translation

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And yet one narrative of the path remains, that it exists. And on this path are a great many signs: namely, that being had no beginning nor can it have an end because it is firmly established, unmoved and eternal. It did not exist once in the past nor will it exist, since it exists at the same time all together, (5) one and continuous. For what origin of it will you seek out? In what way and from where has it increased? I defy you to speak and to think by that which does not exist. For it is not possible that the unspeakable and unthinkable exist. And what compulsion roused it to grow, either sooner or later, even though it began from nothing? (10) Therefore, it is necessary that it exists entirely or not at all. Not once from non-being will credibility allow anything to come-to-be alongside being. On account of this, Justice did not allow being to come-into-being nor for it to pass away by loosening its shackles, but she holds it fast. The judgment concerning these things amounts to this. (15) It either exists or does not exist. It has been decided, as a logical necessity, to leave the one path unthought and unnamed (because it is not a true path), while the other path exists and is true. And how then would what exists perish?  And how could it come into being? For if it was becoming, it is not being, and if it will come-to-be at some time, it is not being. (20) Thus coming-to-be has vanished and passing away is unheard of. It is not divisible, since all is the same. Nor is anything more there, which would hinder it from being held together, and it is not lesser, but it is entirely full of being. Everything is continuous for being. For it is being that engages with being. (25) Moreover, unmoving in the limits of a great bondage, it is without a beginning and without end, since coming-to-be and passing away wandered very far off, and it is good sense which pushed it away. And it remains the same in the same thing in conformity with itself, and it is ordained and in this way it stands fast in that position. (30) For stern Fate holds it in a constrained determinancy, which binds it all around, because it is established that being is not imperfect. For being does not lack. But non-being lacks everything. Thought and that thing on account of which thought exists are both the same thing. For not without being, within which thought has been expressed, will you discover thinking. (35) For nothing else either exists or will exist except being, since Fate fettered it to be whole and unmoving. Every name will belong to being, as many names as mortals establish which they believe are true, believing that named things are coming-into-being and being destroyed, and that they are existing and not existing, (40) and that they exchange one location for another and alter their conspicuous color. But since there is a determinate limit, being is complete from all directions, resembling the body of a well-rounded globe, equally balanced in every direction from the middle. For it is necessary that being exists neither greater to an extent here, nor that it exists greater to an extent there. For neither does non-being exist, which would prevent being from attaining this unification, nor does being exist in any way whatsoever that there would be more of being here and less of being there, since in every way being is an inviolable sanctuary. For equal to itself from every direction, it equally attains itself within the limits. So at this point, I stop the trusted account and thought concerning truth; (50) instead, learn the opinions of this mortal, by listening to the cunning arrangement of my epic poem. For they have settled their mind on naming two forms; of the two, it is not right to name one— on this point they have strayed— and judged them to be opposite things in form and gave them identities apart from each other, (55) for one form there is an etherial flaming fire, it is favorable, surpassingly light weight and not dense, the same to itself from every direction and not the same as the other. But the other is opposite in comformity to itself, a dark night, a dense and heavy body. I declare to you that this arrangement is probable in every way, so that some judgment of mortals will never overtake you.

Epictetus on the Perishing of Pots and People (Part 1)

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 Concerning each of those things that are alluring or have any usefulness or you are fond of, remember to say, what type it is, even beginning from the smallest things: If you are fond of a pot, that, “I am fond of a pot.”  For if it breaks you will not suffer.  If you kiss your very own little child or wife, that you are kissing a human: because if they die, you will not suffer. Epictetus, Enchiridion I.3

ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστου τῶν ψυχαγωγούντων ἢ χρείαν παρεχόντων ἢ στεργομένων μέμνησο ἐπιλέγειν, ὁποῖόν ἐστιν, ἀπὸ τῶν σμικροτάτων ἀρξάμενος: ἂν χύτραν στέργῃς, ὅτι ‘χύτραν στέργω.’ κατεαγείσης γὰρ αὐτῆς οὐ ταραχθήσῃ: ἂν παιδίον σαυτοῦ καταφιλῇς ἢ γυναῖκα, ὅτι ἄνθρωπον καταφιλεῖς: ἀποθανόντος γὰρ οὐ ταραχθήσῃ.

Epictetus has thus far lead us to believe that things either are or are not in our control, and that the former only properly belong to the domain of our concerns.  Chiefly, if not exclusively among those “things” in our power, are our mental states: hupolepsis- plan; horme- desire; oreksis- volition; and ekklisis- avoidance (the opposite of choice).

The practical takeaway amounts to this: If I love a thing I am to tell myself that I love a thing.  But what exactly does this mean?  Epictetus has just introduced three categories of “things” as they relate to us: the alluring, the useful and those things we are fond of.  A pot then, we are to remind ourself, fits into one of these three categories.  Epictetus places it into the “fond of” category.*  Note, not uncoincidentally, that it is we who are to remind ourselves.  If we told other people or vice versa, about this self-reflective protocol, we would in fact be transgressing Epictetus’ injunction to concern ourselves only with what is in our power.  If anything is not in our power, it is certainly the thoughts of other men.  For our own part however, conjuring up the thought, or perhaps even audibly voicing the words, “I am fond of a pot” is not necessarily supposed to sef-consciously evoke the brute absurdity of the utterance.  What I understand Epictetus to be doing is that when we say, “I am fond of a cup” we are to mentally categorize the object, the cup, into one of the three previous categories.  Either it is alluring, useful or loved.  It is the third, and after this recognition we are to note that if either of the two elements out our control, ourself (including our body) or the cup, is taken out of the equation, whether through destruction, theft, or injury, then we are immediately dealing with a concern not properly our own.  We can and must engage only with that in our control.  A destroyed pot, out of our control, is by definition something we should not concern ourselves with.  We should not say of a non-existing pot, “I am fond of a pot” just as we could not say, “I am fond of a pot” if we ourselves were to cease to be.

*(“Be fond of”, translated in three different places above, is here from the verb stergo, a term not normally associated with erotic love nor love for a friend, but often concerns the mutual love of parents and children.)